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conomists, whose discipline has always had a strong relationship to moral
philosophy (Adam Smith, the author of
The Wealth of Nations, also wrote the celebrated Theory of Moral Sentiments), have
always seen their role in society as that
of pursuing the public good. They properly see themselves as guardians of the
public interest, and to be engaged in
public-policy debates against special interests who wish to ‘capture’ policy to
advance their narrowly circumscribed,
self-serving agendas.
I must note at the outset that as one
analyzes the public debates on questions
of economic policy, one sees cynical attempts by special interests to gain the
higher ground. One might observe wryly that in the battle for public support,

one tries to gain the advantage by claiming that the opponent’s interest is ‘special’ and one’s own is ‘general.’ We have
long known that special interests have
learned their Orwell well: they understand that words matter in public debates.
Thus, protectionists have typically
used the inviting phrase ‘fair trade’ to
mask their protectionism.1 This was
true at the end of the nineteenth century when Britain, the long-standing proponent of free trade, was facing the rise
of Germany and the United States. As
Britain experienced what I have called
‘diminished giant syndrome,’ ‘fair trade’
became a cry of the protectionists, who
charged these newly emerged and protectionist trading nations with ‘unfair
trade’ and condemned Britain’s freetrade policy as inappropriate. The United States would confront the same syndrome a century later, with the dramatic
rise of Japan in the 1980s and the dreaded prospect that the twenty-½rst century would be Japan’s as the twentieth
was America’s and the nineteenth was
Britain’s. Exactly as in Britain at the end
1 Throughout this essay, I draw on examples
from the theory of commercial policy where
my scholarly expertise is the greatest. Similar
examples can surely be drawn from other areas
of economic scholarship and policymaking.
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ideas alone: it is not enough to have the
generals; one must also have the troops.
Also, if special interests, like corporate
interests, happen to see their pro½t in
what one proposes, that does not subtract from the fact that the policy one is
advocating is prompted by the public interest.
One lesson for the economists who
seek to influence public policy, however,
is to ensure that they do not open themselves to the charge that they have been
‘bought.’ In the 1980s and early 1990s,
the years of Japan-bashing in the United
States, I was almost alone in defending
Japan against exaggerated, hysterical attacks by Detroit and other U.S. producers, and by the media and the politicians.
At the time, I was careful not to accept
any moneys for even a lecture or a conference paper in Japan. When I went to a
conference associated with the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (organized by my good friend
Professor Ryutaro Komiya, whom I got
to know well when he was at Harvard
and I was at mit in 1956–1957), we were
all offered $2,000 for our papers. All the
Japan-bashers readily accepted the money; I said I would write but not accept
the honorarium. So I was given an extra
lunch coupon! I used it to eat tempura in
the Okura Hotel. Later, I told my friends
that I had had $2,000 tempura in Tokyo.
The punch line, however, was that prices
in Tokyo were so high, and even more
outrageous in the big hotels, that I could
very well have had tempura for $2,000!
For much the same reason, I have refused to consult with multinationals or
to sit on their boards of directors. I generally defend multinationals against
knee-jerk attacks from agitators who
view multinationals and their ‘pro½ts’
the way moneylenders and ‘usury’ were
regarded in the Middle Ages. Undeniably my refusal to get rich in the way
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of the nineteenth century, the United
States witnessed the growth of demands
for ‘fair trade,’ and charges against Japan
that it was a wicked ‘unfair trader’ that
excluded imports and dumped its exports.
The latest proponents of such demands are the afl-cio and the New
Democrats–and therefore the Old
Democrats who must fall in line. They
are concerned with competition from
the poor countries instead. Desperately
seeking ways to protect themselves from
such competition, they claim that these
poor nations are indulging in ‘unfair
trade’ because they have labor and domestic environmental standards not
identical to those in the United States.
Raising these standards in the poor
countries, in the name of ‘fair trade,’
is nothing but a form of ‘export protectionism’: it is aimed at raising the cost
of production in these countries and
thereby moderating the competition
they pose.
These lobbies are equally adept at disguising this protectionist agenda by simultaneously asserting that their demands to have the poor nations raise
their labor standards to U.S. levels are
inspired by empathy and altruism for
the workers in the poor countries–a
claim that is belied by reading the campaign speeches of the New Democrats,
who always speak instead of the unfairness of losing jobs to rivals with lower
standards, i.e., import competition.
Moreover, these lobbies frequently
paint economists as venal fronts for ‘corporate interests’ on issues such as free
trade. These lobbies forget John Stuart
Mill’s observation that no general interest was ever advanced unless someone’s
special interest was advanced alongside
it. In a democratic society, where votes
matter, free-traders like myself realize
that free trade cannot be advanced by

B

ut even when a scrupulous economist
avoids these pitfalls, substantive problems still arise in pursuing the public interest. These come from two different
directions.
If we are to pursue the public interest
by arguing that one policy is preferable
over another (say, freer trade over retreat into further protectionism), we
need to be able to analyze persuasively how the different policies will work.
Then, we must have a criterion by which
we choose among these policies, in light
of this analysis. Economists call the ½rst
‘positive’ analysis, and the second ‘normative’ analysis. If either is defective,
the economist’s ability to say that a speci½c policy advances the public interest
is compromised.
In truth, even the positive analysis
leads often to irreconcilable differences,
not just between economists and others
but among economists themselves, vexing politicians who would prefer clearer
guidance. Prime Minister Robert Peel,
who abolished England’s Corn Laws in
1846 and introduced free trade to the
world for the ½rst time, was clearly converted to free trade by the writings of
economists starting with Adam Smith,
though the celebrated Chicago economist George Stigler has written unpersuasively that “economists exert a minor and scarcely detectable influence
on the societies in which they live . . . .
If Cobden [who led the anti-Corn Law
movement] had spoken only a little Yiddish, and with a stammer, and Peel had
been a narrow, stupid man, England
would have moved toward free trade in
grain as its agricultural classes declined
and its manufacturing and commercial
classes grew.”2
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many economists do today has enabled
me to be more credible when I defend
corporations against unjusti½ed assaults.
Let me add that corporations are often
buying an economist’s reputation, not
his or her analytical judgments. Their
game often is simply to say, at a suitable
price, that Professor Jagdish Bhagwati
or Professor Paul Krugman or Professor William Baumol is on our side. We
would be wise not to yield to such blandishments. We may give our advice anonymously, but to give it with our names
attached is to throw our reputation in
the face of their opponents and also in
the mud. Once, an important beverage
company operating in India asked me
to calculate the Indian elasticity of demand for canned sodas. It clearly hoped
to argue that the elasticity was so high
that a reduction in the sales tax on them
would raise more, not less, revenue (à la
the Laffer curve). This request surprised
me–since I am an economist who works
with ideas and never crunches numbers
–until I realized that they had to know
that I was a close friend of the ½nance
minister (now the prime minister). So
I replied mischievously: I am afraid I
cannot do this until the ½nance minister
changes. Naturally, I never heard from
them again.
Economists are also tempted today by
large fees that accrue when they testify
in court on behalf of corporate clients.
Lawyers do this all the time, though outstanding jurists abstain from such practice. Once, I was giving a keynote speech
at Yale Law School, when a lawyer teased
me with the old chestnut, that where
there are six economists there are six
opinions (though Keynes had said seven
opinions, two being his own). I teased
him back from the lectern: That is bad,
but with lawyers the situation is worse.
Each lawyer has six opinions if he has six
clients.

2 George Stigler, The Economist as Preacher and
Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982), 63–64.
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But Peel also famously lamented the
fact that he often found conflicting analysis of the central questions in what was
then called ‘political economy.’ Thus he
argued in the Parliament:

3 Quoted in Douglas Irwin, “Political Economy
and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws,” Economics
& Politics 1 (1) (Spring 1989). Adam Smith was
the dominant ½gure in the new science of political economy (Economics); but David Ricardo
enjoys a nearly equal reputation, and Malthus
and Torrens were also major writers, active in
the debates of their time.

4 In several publications during the last decade,
I have reviewed and systematized the repeated
episodes over two centuries of theoretical departures from the case for free trade for different types of market failures. The easiest to access is Free Trade Today (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), based on lectures at
the Stockholm School of Economics.

Far be it for me to depreciate that noble
science which is conversant with the laws
that regulate the production of wealth and
seeks to make human industry most conducive to human comfort and enjoyment.
. . . I ½nd the dif½culties [faced by us in accepting their less-than-compelling analysis] greatly increased by the conflict of
authorities . . . . The very heads of Colonel
Torrens’s chapters are enough to ½ll with
dismay the bewildered inquirer after
truth. These are literally these: ‘Erroneous
views of Adam Smith respecting the value
of Corn’ . . . ‘Errors of Mr. Ricardo and his
followers on the subject of rents,’ ‘Error
of Mr. Malthus respecting the nature of
rent,’ ‘Refutation of the doctrines of Mr.
Malthus respecting the wages of labour.’3
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Little has changed since then. At the
heart of the problem is the fact that not
all economists share the same model. A
model, whether explicit or implicit, provides the map of how a policy will work.
Thus different schools plague macroeconomics: monetarist (Milton Friedman),
Keynesian, rational expectations (Robert Lucas), and varying versions of each.
But even if we were to agree on a model
to look at the world, we can and will disagree on the parameters that feed into
the model.
So we can take it for granted that
some economists will dissent even in

cases where there is substantial consensus, such as whether free trade is a better policy than protectionism. There is,
however, socially useful dissent, and
then there is socially unproductive dissent. The case for free trade, and its historical evolution since the time Adam
Smith wrote of its virtue over two centuries ago, illustrates this distinction
well.
Take ½rst the useful dissent. Since
Adam Smith, prominent economists
have disputed the merits of free trade.
The reason was simple. Put heuristically, the case for free trade depends on
our faith in the ability of market prices
to reflect social costs. When there are
market failures, an empirical issue, the
Invisible Hand (which depends on market prices being socially correct guides
to ef½cient allocation of resources) could
be pointing in the wrong direction. During the period of massive unemployment after the Great Crash of 1929, (the
positive) market wages did not represent
the true social cost of labor (which was
zero), and Keynes became a famous advocate for protection.
In modern times, since World War II,
economists have analyzed imperfections
in the labor and other ‘factor’ markets;
and my students Paul Krugman and
Gene Grossman have likewise examined
imperfections in the product markets.4
However, in 1963, I restored the case
for free trade by arguing that all we
needed to do was apply an appropriate
policy to remove the market failure.
For example, if producers in an indus-

5 It is reassuring that few Noble Laureates behave like this. The danger with a Nobel Laureate dispensing errors is particularly great
when it comes to developing countries. These

a new ‘market,’ a populist audience, and
aspire to join the ranks of Naomi Klein
and Arundhati Roy, whose conclusions
are more obvious than their arguments.
These few dissenters are a nuisance, diverting economists into ½ghting rubbish
within their own ranks. Yet they present
no real threat to the ability of the profession to advance the public interest.
Then again, the aging population, and
the speed with which science changes,
creates intergenerational differences in
analysis, as the older scholars ½nd their
modes of analysis being replaced by new
ones. Several scholars age gracelessly.
When Paul Samuelson was asked how
often science changed, he replied, “With
every funeral.” But even when they do
accept the new gracefully, differences
in perception, from the use of ‘older’
models, carry over into different views
of the ‘positive’ issues at hand. In the recent debate on globalization, some have
argued that as economies such as India’s
and China’s grow more like us in their
endowments (i.e., develop scientists, engineers, and doctors), the gains from our
specialization in skill-intensive products
will decline. But we now know, from
theoretical work on ‘trade in variety’ or
‘trade in similar products,’ that specialization takes place within industries.
So as countries grow similar in endowments, trade in similar products breaks
out: one can observe this by walking
down Madison Avenue and observing
the many men’s fashion designers, such
as Giorgio Armani, Christian Dior, Ken-

Economic
policy in
the public
interest

Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/136/4/37/1829358/daed.2007.136.4.37.pdf by Columbia University user on 01 October 2021

try were polluting without having to pay
for the pollution, then their social cost
would exceed their private cost. Society
would be overproducing in that industry, and free trade might well be harmful relative to protection. But if we introduced a ‘polluter pay’ tax, we could
remove the market failure and go back
to free trade. This simple insight transformed the postwar theory of commercial policy, restoring to free trade its preeminence and widespread support in the
profession.
The few dissenters to free trade today
are unlike earlier dissenters. They fall
into the category of unproductive dissenters. I suspect that their activities
are a response to the perverse incentives
that characterize economic dissent.
Unlike the political dissenters (such as
Vaclav Havel) who typically lived under
grueling conditions, today’s economic
dissenters flourish. The sheer dearth of
these dissenters raises their value immensely. The foundations that fund the
current pandemic of conferences want
the ‘opposing’ point of view represented. So these dissenters are going to Oslo,
Tokyo, Port Alegre, Paris, and other exotic places to attend seminars and conferences where they are welcome simply because economists who espouse
their viewpoints are scarce. They also
½nd themselves addressing adoring
crowds, such as at the World Social Forum, where passion outweighs intellectual competence in these areas. And if
one is a Nobel Laureate, the incentive
to behave as an economic dissenter is
greater still: after all, if one has the Nobel Prize, why worry about what one’s
peers think?5 Instead, one can cultivate

countries typically tend to be ascriptive and
also do not have the local expertise to challenge erroneous pronouncements and advice.
By contrast, in the developed countries, there
is a lot of expertise and debate, and there are
many Nobel Laureates and also other distinguished scholars, who can counter nonsense
propounded by their peers who play to the
gallery.
Dædalus Fall 2007
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n normative analysis, the economics
profession runs into dif½culties as genuine as the ones that afflict it in positive
analysis. Contrary to what public-policy debates might suggest, economists
do try to answer the question of how to
judge whether a policy is ‘better’ than
another. Suf½ce it here to indicate some
of the ways in which they have grappled
with the issue.
Perhaps the most important observation I can make is to indicate how in a
multiperson economy one can call a
policy better than another. If Robinson
Crusoe were to put Man Friday on a
boat, leaving us to judge his one-person
welfare as total welfare, life would be
simple. But as soon as you have two (or
more) people in a society, how do we
determine if a policy change improves
welfare if one person’s welfare increases
but another’s declines?
The typical criterion that economists
have settled upon is the Pareto criterion:
if the policy change improves Robinson
Crusoe’s welfare but decreases Man Friday’s, the policy change increases overall
welfare if Robinson Crusoe can compensate Man Friday and still have enough
gravy left over to make himself better
off. This sounds great until you realize,
as my famous Oxford teacher Ian Little
42
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noted in his pathbreaking work, that this
is only a ‘possibility’ criterion: if Man
Friday is left in reality with his reduced
welfare, few would agree that the welfare of Robinson Crusoe’s island society
actually improved.
Economists, with increasing sophistication culminating in work such as
Samuelson’s, have shown that free trade
is a Pareto-better policy. But suppose,
as we liberalize trade, that the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer, and no
actual compensation takes place. Should
we call Freer Trade a better policy than
increased Protection? If we cannot compensate the losers, then many would reject this conclusion.
So, if positive analysis leads one to argue that trade with poor countries and
other forms of economic globalization,
such as multinational investment outflow to these countries and inflow of unskilled immigrants from them, is causing
the poor to get poorer in the rich countries (Marx’s prediction of the immiseration of the proletariat did not materialize in the nineteenth and most of twentieth centuries but may now be striking
again with the aid of globalization), and
if one thinks that actual compensation
to the losers is not feasible because of
the decline of the welfare state, then that
person would reject freer trade. This
may well describe the state of thinking
on free trade in the United States today.
But this is as good as the positive analysis of the effects of trade (and immigration and multinational investments). As
I have argued in many places,6 the assertion by the afl-cio, and the New Dem6 E.g., chapter 10 of my book, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004); the afterword in the new edition issued
in August 2007, which offers more analysis of
the issues; and several recent Financial Times
op-ed articles and letters on U.S. trade policy,
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zo, Calvin Klein, and Pierre Cardin,
compete and coexist in the same fashion industry while offering the customers much gain. Both my student Robert
Feenstra, who is the leading econometrician of trade today and heads the
nber Program on International Trade,
and my colleague David Weinstein have
estimated these gains from similar products and concluded that they are huge.
Once we admit into our thinking a new
‘model,’ our view of reality changes:
in this instance, toward a more benign
view of globalization.

especially “Technology, Not Globalization, is
Driving Wages Down,” January 4, 2007.
7 His book, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 2002), was reviewed jointly with my
book, Free Trade Today (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2002) in The
New York Review of Books, March 25, 2004.
8 See Peter Singer, “What Should a Billionaire
Give–and What Should You?” New York Times
Magazine, December 17, 2004. The large literature on how aid may have a malign impact,
and might even be given with malign intent,
is ignored by the proponents of a substantial

is good for the recipients? Or that we
should give aid, as Singer proposes?
Furthermore, economists must respond to intergenerational income-distribution problems in addition to Robinson Crusoe versus Man Friday problems. A typical question we grapple with
is: what is the ‘optimal’ rate of saving?
Now with environmental concerns at
the forefront, we must also wonder:
what do we owe to future generations?
These are income-distribution questions
over time, not just within a given society.
There are questions of income distribution over space as well. Immigration
is one example. How do we evaluate a
freer immigration policy versus a restrictionist one in situations where the immigrants gain but their outmigration
harms those left behind (as with some
poor countries suffering from ‘brain
drain’)? Should immigrants’ welfare be
aggregated with that of the countries
receiving them or with that of the countries losing them, or with both, or with
neither? The sophisticated discussion
of these issues is to be found in economists’ writings from time to time; but it
is virtually lost in the din of heated debates over immigration.
Economists are aware that in discussing public good, they must also allow
for what another of my Oxford teachers,
Roy Harrod, called ‘process utilitarianism.’ Often, economists (who are generally utilitarians) will consider a policy to be better because it augments ef½ciency and therefore the availability
of goods and services. But one might
object to the process (e.g., markets) by
which we arrive at that ef½cient solution. As Richard Posner once argued,
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ocrats they support and capture, that
globalization is placing the economic
pressure on the wages of the unskilled
and even the middle class is not tenable.
Their policy prescription against free
trade, though justi½ed by a normative
criterion that many of us share as citizens and economists, is vitiated by erroneous analysis, and thus handicaps, not
advances, the public good.
Indeed, there are many other instances
in the public-policy domain today where
bad analysis married to good normative
criteria has created counterproductive
results, setting the public interest back
instead of advancing it. The renowned
philosopher, Peter Singer, wrote a book
against globalization, which marries his
utilitarian analysis with large amounts
of antiglobalization nonsense, marring
an otherwise interesting book.7 He also
recently wrote a New York Times Magazine article on foreign aid, which argued
that there was a moral case for more
foreign aid but betrayed absolutely no
awareness of the enormous analytical,
empirical, and econometric literature,
both recent and from the 1960s through
1980s, on why aid could be unproductive and, more important, counterproductive.8 If aid results in less, not more,
development, how can one say that aid

surge in aid like my colleague Jeffrey Sachs;
but that is neither persuasive to scholarly
economists nor calculated to advance the public good.
Dædalus Fall 2007
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a market in baby adoptions would distribute babies ef½ciently, but most of
us would ½nd such a market distasteful.
Or should we allow rich people to park
in spaces for the handicapped just by
buying special permits to do so: should
not everyone have to assume the obligation to keep these spaces off-limits to the
nonhandicapped? Or should Al Gore be
allowed to buy offsets (i.e., ½nance co2emission reductions) from others when
he emits a lot of carbon in his home? It
is ½ne if Al Gore wants to ½nance co2emission reductions, but it should not
be used to justify a lifestyle where he assumes no responsibility to cut down his
own emissions.
These issues are very much what we
economists deal with as we discuss the
public good. Our analysis, and our appreciation of the nuances involved, is
much richer than what many critics,
who are not familiar with the ways of
sophisticated economists and go by
what they learned in 101 classes from
indifferently written textbooks, assume
to be the case. Familiarity breeds contempt, but contempt does not breed familiarity.

